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Abstract 
 
Using a detailed and large data set on cross-border merger and acquisitions we discuss the 
relationship between theory and observed empirical characteristics: 
 most FDI is in the form of M&As, 
 firms engaged in M&As seem to be ‘market-seeking’, 
 M&As come in waves (the most recent wave is still unfolding), 
 economic integration (international deregulation) stimulated M&As, 
 the size of and inequality between M&As grows over time. 
Our contention in this chapter is that these stylized facts drive and should drive recent 
theoretical contributions in the field of international economics that try to understand cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. Although some models (notably Neary, 2003) explain a 
number of the characteristics, a full-fledged model of cross-border M&As that, at least in 
principle, can deal with all the characteristics is still lacking. 
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1 Introduction 
Theoretical developments in international economics are sometimes motivated by 
empirical findings. The ‘new trade theory’, for example, was to a large extent inspired 
by empirical work on intra-industry trade (Neary, 2004b). This also holds for the 
recent outburst of research on foreign direct investment (FDI) as one of the driving 
forces behind the current wave of globalization. Many observers have noted that FDI 
grows much faster than world merchandise trade (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 
2004). This is clearly a stylized fact in search of an explanation. For years, students of 
FDI used the OLI-categorisation scheme of Dunning (1993) to understand why firms 
engage in FDI. Notwithstanding its usefulness in the case of FDI, a categorisation 
scheme is not a model. New theories are being developed in which the firm’s decision 
on FDI engagement is determined in a full-fledged micro-economic model. 
 
Figure 1 Distribution of different types of FDI 
Foreign Direct Investment
Greenfield investments Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As)
Mergers Acquisitions
full acquisition more than 50%acquisition
10-49%
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22% 78%
3% 97%
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Source: Brakman et al. (2006); data: UNCTAD (2000); 78-22% in value terms, other % in # of deals 
 
Interestingly, looking at FDI as a broad category obscures the fact that most FDI is in 
the form of so-called cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions (henceforth: M&As). 
Figure 1 shows a decomposition of FDI from which it is clear that M&As constitute 
the bulk of FDI, whereas greenfield FDI is less important than M&As. The main 
difference between these two investments is that in an M&A “control of assets and 
operations is transferred from a local to a foreign company, the former becoming an 
affiliate of the latter” (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 99). Only recently models in international 
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economics have been developed that enable us to understand M&As (Neary, 2004b). 
Neary’s model takes the standard explanations for M&As a step further. Usually two 
motives are mentioned to explain M&As: a strategic motive (reduce competition) and 
an efficiency motive (cost reductions). An explanation of cross-border M&As, 
however, also has to explain the cross-border part of the deals. Trade theory suggests 
that comparative advantage could be included in full explanations of M&As, see 
Neary (2004a). A different, equally novel line of research in international economics 
(see Barba-Navaretti and Venables, 2004, or Helpman, 2006, for excellent surveys), 
seeks to understand the conditions under which firms decide to locate (part of) their 
production abroad (the off-shoring decision). When they decide to off-shore, some 
firms do so under the flag of FDI, while other firms go for outsourcing. In this 
literature, and in contrast to the empirical relevance illustrated in Figure 1, the role of 
cross-border M&As is, however, largely ignored. The aim of this chapter is to present 
stylized facts on cross-border M&As. This is not only interesting in its own right (see 
also Evenett, 2004), but may also act as a guide for the recent upsurge of interest in 
FDI and its alternatives in international economics regarding the facts that the modern 
theory of FDI should be able to explain. When highlighting the stylized facts in this 
chapter, we therefore briefly point out those FDI models in international economics 
that are able to cope with the facts under consideration. 
 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents basic characteristics of M&As using the 
database of Thomson Financial Securities Data (Thomson, hereafter). The advantage 
of this source over UNCTAD data is that it consists of individual data on each and 
every M&A, enabling us to look at M&As at a very detailed level. Section 3 provides 
information at the country level. Section 4 looks at the regional composition of target 
and acquirer, which are both typically to be found in the OECD countries. Section 5 
confronts gross M&As with net M&As and discusses some developments over time, 
confirming that emerging markets, like China and Eastern Europe, are increasingly 
becoming net targets. Section 6 argues that the inequality within the set of M&As 
tends to increase over time. Section 7 discusses the characteristics of firms involved in 
FDI. Section 8, finally, concludes and summarizes our findings.  
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2 Cross-border M&As: basic characteristics 
Our overview of the structure and developments of cross-border M&As is based on 
Thomson’s Global Mergers and Acquisitions database, which provides the best and 
most extensive data source for M&As to date. Thomson gathers information on 
M&As exceeding 1 million US dollar. Its main sources of information are financial 
newspapers and specialized agencies like Bloomberg and Reuters. Our Thomson data 
set begins in 1979 and ends in August 2006. Initially, Thomson focused on American 
M&As. Systematic M&A data for almost all countries is available for about the last 
20 years. In presenting the data we therefore focus on the period 1986 – 2005, usually 
grouped in four five-year sub-periods to mitigate the large annual fluctuations 
characteristic of M&As and to enable us to discern longer term trends.  
 
Table 1 Overview of cross-border M&As 
 # of deals per cent 
Cross-border M&As, 1986-2005  27,541  
 Effective M&As  27,461 99.7 
 Average per cent of shares acquired   75.5 
 Average per cent of shares owned after deal   80.1 
 # of tender offers  2,476 9.0 
 # horizontal M&As (2-digit level) 13,605 49.4 
 Public status of target    
   government  658 2.4 
   joint venture  977 3.5 
   subsidiary  11,053 40.1 
   public  7,343 26.7 
   private  7,489 27.2 
   unknown / other  21 0.1 
 Public status of acquirer    
   government  298 1.1 
   joint venture  499 1.8 
   subsidiary  6,814 24.7 
   public  15,796 57.4 
   private  4,067 14.8 
   unknown / other  67 0.2 
 # of deals involving cash  25,665 93.2 
   if so average share of payment   94.4 
 # of deals involving stock  2,635 9.6 
   if so average share of payment   73.1 
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We collected information on all completed / unconditional cross-border M&As with a 
deal value of at least $10 million. In the period 1986 – 2005 this provided us with 
27,541 cross-border M&As, see the overview in Table 1.  
 
There is usually no or only a very short time difference between the date of 
announcement of an M&A deal and the date the deal is effective (such that 99.7 per 
cent of the deals is effective). The announced date is the same as the effective date for 
about 38 per cent of the M&A deals. On average the difference between these to dates 
is 0.18 year. We therefore used the date of announcement for classifying the M&A 
deals over time, see also Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk (2005, 2006). In 
general, a large share of a company (on average 75.5 per cent) is acquired by the deal, 
leading to a majority ownership after the deal is completed (on average owning 80.1 
per cent of the acquired company). This indicates that most firms already have 
‘intimate’ knowledge of the firm that is acquired. Payment for the acquisition usually 
involves cash (93.2 per cent of the deals) and, if so, it is usually completely paid for in 
cash (on average 94.4 per cent of the deals involving cash is paid for in cash). 
Payment of the deal using shares occurs regularly (9.6 per cent of the deals) and, if so, 
it is usually completely paid for in shares (on average 73.1 per cent of the deals 
involving stocks is paid for in stocks). The fact that many takeovers are financed with 
cash does not imply that shares are not important in those deals: raising cash is very 
much facilitated if stock prices of the firms involved are high. This might be the 
motive to announcing takeovers before the actual takeover takes place; 
announcements tend to affect share prices in an upward direction (see also Box 1).1 
 
Box 1 Cross-border M&A profitability 
For this chapter it is instructive to present a simple way of looking at a cross-border 
M&A. It is more a way of organizing thoughts than a complete model, but it 
illustrates the key issues involved. Let “1” and “0” indicate the post- and pre-merger 
situation, respectively. Then the gain of taking over a Home firm, HG , by a foreign 
firm is given by: 
                                                 
1 As to (negative) relation between profits and share prices w.r.t. M&As  see Fridolfsson and Stennek 
(2005). 
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(1) [ ] 0.)*,(.)*,(.)*,1( 0*0*1 >−−−= nnnnnnGH πππ  
The first term (in square brackets) relates to the gain in profitability from reduced 
competition by taking over the domestic firm: the number of domestic firms is 
reduced by 1 , from n to (n-1). The number of foreign firms, n*,  does not change.   
The second term indicates the cost of acquiring the domestic firm, This is a function 
of profits of the target – the more profitable a target is, the higher the take-over costs – 
and the cost of financing the take-over. If the acquirer has a windfall gain, for 
example, higher share prices due to the takeover, the finance costs are smaller The │. 
indicates that other variables are taken as given. The balance between the change in 
profits and the costs involved in the M&A determines whether or not a takeover will 
take place. Whether the increase in profits really materializes after the M&A has 
taken place is another issue, but the equation illustrates how in international 
economics (the equation is taken from Neary, 2004a) the firm decision on whether or 
not to engage in a cross border M&A is very simple. The firm (and its organizational 
set-up) itself is something of a black box and the focus is on how changes in the 
external environment (fall in transportation costs, lowering of tariffs) might have an 
impact on equation (1), and thus on the M&A decision.    
  
There are substantial differences between the public status of acquiring and target 
firms. The majority of acquiring firms are public companies (57.4 per cent), followed 
by subsidiaries (24.7 per cent), and private firms (14.8 per cent), respectively. The 
target company, on the other hand, is usually a subsidiary (40.1 per cent), followed by 
a private company (27.2 per cent) and a public company (26.7 per cent), respectively. 
The share of subsidiaries and private companies among the target companies is 
therefore substantially larger and the share of public companies is substantially lower.  
 
To classify M&As between horizontal and other types of deals (be they vertical or 
conglomerate), we used the SIC classification of target and acquirer as provided by 
Thomson at the 2-digit level; a deal is therefore an horizontal M&A in our 
classification if the acquirer and target are active in the same 2-digit sector. On 
average, about half of the M&As are horizontal deals (49.4 per cent, see below for 
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further details). Thus to a large extent investments take place in the same sector. One 
can speculate why this might be the case. Strategic motives may of course be at work 
here. but as we will argue below the most likely explanation is probably that most 
cross-border M&A belong to the category of market-seeking FDI. Taking one of your 
competitors out of the market reduces competition and increases profits. Buying a 
firm outside one’s own sector might be motivated by an efficiency motive: it can be 
profitable to control a larger part of the value chain. Both motives increase profits 
after the take-over. We also argue that, since most cross-border M&As belong to the 
category of horizontal FDI, market-seeking motives play a dominant role in M&As. 
 
Figure 2 Horizontal (2-digit) cross-border M&As; share of total, # of deals and value 
Horizontal cross-border M&As, share of total
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Horizontal lines indicate averages for the period 1986-2005. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that the share of horizontal M&As is very stable over time when 
measured using the number of deals; fluctuating relatively little around the average of 
49 per cent, ranging from a low of 45.1 per cent in 1986 to a high of 51.5 per cent in 
1996. Horizontal M&As are substantially more volatile when measured using the 
value of the deals; fluctuating around the average of 56 per cent, ranging from a low 
of 46.7 per cent in 1988 to a high of 73.0 per cent in 1999. Using either measure, we 
find little support for the argument that the share of horizontal M&As is declining. 
Those who would argue that the value of horizontal M&As has declined since 1999 
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are obviously obscuring the fact that this peak in 1999 is not representative over a 
longer time horizon. The current (2005) value of horizontal M&As of 55.2 per cent is 
very close to the long run average of 56 per cent. From an international economics’ 
perspective, see our introduction, the question is if existing theories of FDI can 
explain the dominance of horizontal FDI. At first sight, this is not the case. Assuming 
that during our sample period 1985-2005 trade costs broadly defined have, if 
anything, decreased the standard FDI model then predicts that horizontal FDI should 
become less important. With falling trade costs foreign markets might ceteris paribus 
be better served by exporting instead of FDI, and in the well-known proximity-
concentration trade-off, a drop in trade costs shifts the trade-off in favor of exporting. 
However, Neary (2005) shows that falling trade costs might still explain the rise of 
horizontal FDI, and thus of the bulk of cross-border M&As, once we allow for an FDI 
model that explicitly incorporates the possibility of cross-border M&As instead of 
merely looking at FDI as a black box (see Neary, 2004a).     
 
Figure 3 Cross-border M&As, 1985 – 2005; # of deals and value 
Cross-border M&As, 1985-2005; # of deals (left hand scale) 
and value in 2005 $ billion (right hand scale)
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An historical perspective reveals a remarkable characteristic of M&As. Figure 2 
depicts the evolution of all cross-border M&As over time, both measured as the 
number of deals and the value of deals (in constant 2005 $ bn., using the US GDP 
deflator). Clearly, there is substantial variation over time, with periods of rapid 
increase followed by periods of rapid decline. Five merger waves have been identified 
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during the 20th century, three of which are recent (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 
2001). The 3rd wave took place in the late 1960-early 1970s. The 4th wave ran from 
about the mid 1980s until 1990. The 5th wave started around 1995 and ended in 2000 
with the collapse of the “new economy”. Figure 3 shows that a subsequent 6th (still 
ongoing) merger wave started in the 21st century around 2003. Note, that the data used 
in this chapter cover the last two waves. 
 
Merger waves are positively correlated with increases in share prices and p/e ratios, 
and with the overall business cycle in general. However, the causality of the relation 
is not always clear. On the one hand, an upswing of the business cycle increases share 
prices, and high share prices reduce the cost of financing a M&A. On the other hand 
the same upswing of the business-cycle increases the profits of the target and increase 
take-over costs (see also Box 1). When one sticks to standard M&A motives, like the 
efficiency argument, it is rather difficult to explain the synchronicity of M&As. 
Gugler et al. (2004) argue that merger waves can be understood if one acknowledges 
that M&As do not boost efficiency and hence do not increase shareholders’ wealth. 
Instead, they find that M&A waves are best looked upon as the result of overvalued 
shares and managerial discretion. For the case of the USA and restricting their sample 
to firms that are publicly traded, Andrade et al. (2001) show that with each merger 
wave the value of the M&A deals (measured by firms’ market capitalization) 
increases strongly. Merger waves in Europe seem to follow those in the USA with a 
short lag. During the 5th merger wave, European firms engaged in a number of (mega) 
M&As with the cross-border take-over of Mannesmann (Germany) by Vodafone 
(UK) for $203 bn. in 1999/2000 as to date the largest M&A. It turns out that 
especially this part of M&A waves is difficult to model. First of all, an M&A wave 
must start at some point in time. Equation (1) points at a difficulty in this respect. A 
reduction of competition makes an M&A profitable, which implies that it is rational to 
wait for other M&As to go first, because this reduces competition and makes the next 
M&A more profitable than the first one. Second, an M&A wave must stop at some 
point. Both elements should be incorporated in a full M&A model. Neary (2004a) 
does just that: waves have to start at some point in time or else M&A profits are 
foregone. Moreover, since it is a general equilibrium model, the excess supply on the 
labor market following an M&A (lower wages resulting in higher profits) finally stop 
the wave. 
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3 Countries and M&As in 2005 
This section provides an overview of the currently (2005) most active countries in  
M&As. There were 2,154 cross-border M&As in 2005 with a total value of about 
$774 bn. Table 2 provides an overview of the top 20 countries ranked in order of 
acquirer value. Not surprisingly, the United States tops the list, both in value and 
number of deals, acquiring 514 foreign firms with a total value of about $158 bn (20.4 
per cent of the total). The United States is also the largest target country in 2005 when 
measured in number of deals (356) and the second largest target in value terms ($125 
bn). The United Kingdom is the second largest acquiring country (286 deals and $94 
bn) and the largest target country in value ($144 bn; second largest in number of 
deals). Among the other countries listed in Table 2 are the “usual suspects” of high 
income (European) countries: Spain, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Israel, Australia, Canada, Japan, Russia, 
and Hong Kong. More remarkable, presumably, are the high ranks for Egypt, United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), and even tiny Luxembourg.  
 
Table 2 Cross-border M&As; top 20 countries in 2005 
(ranked according to acquirer value) 
  in value terms ($ million) in # of deals 
 Country acquirer % of total target acquirer target
1 United States 157,924 20.4 124,764 514 356
2 United Kingdom 94,104 12.2 143,754 286 262
3 Spain 59,953 7.7 22,531 49 58
4 France 58,606 7.6 36,733 86 110
5 Germany 48,081 6.2 65,053 79 136
6 Italy 37,897 4.9 48,593 48 58
7 Australia 31,722 4.1 10,048 137 106
8 Switzerland 30,973 4.0 6,710 35 22
9 Netherlands 28,664 3.7 32,416 64 38
10 Sweden 19,555 2.5 17,799 63 44
11 Egypt 16,992 2.2 2,227 6 9
12 Canada 15,679 2.0 26,943 121 87
13 Luxembourg 14,584 1.9 7,808 21 7
14 United Arab Emirates 14,565 1.9 86 11 1
15 Japan 12,034 1.6 3,538 70 26
16 Russia 11,088 1.4 7,818 22 28
17 Denmark 9,341 1.2 20,933 27 33
18 Hong Kong 9,213 1.2 10,107 60 63
19 Israel 8,847 1.1 2,001 17 18
20 Norway 8,799 1.1 7,329 20 33
 
Cross-border M&As: the facts 
© Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk, 2006  11 
As suggested by the fact that the USA and the UK take the two top spots in Table 2 
both as acquirer and target, there is substantial coincidence between acquirers and 
targets (large acquiring countries are usually also large target countries, and vice 
versa). Indeed, of the 20 countries listed as the largest acquirers in value terms in 
Table 2, fifteen also appear among the top 20 as largest targets in value terms. Only 
Switzerland, Egypt, UAE, Japan, and Israel would have to be replaced by Belgium, 
China, Turkey, Czech Rep., and South Korea. This coincidence is illustrated in Figure 
4 using logarithmic scales. The figure also indicates that the Czech Rep. is indeed a 
relatively large target and the UAE is indeed a relatively large acquirer. 
 
Figure 4 Cross-border M&As; 2005, value ($ million, log scales) 
Cross-border M&As; 2005, value ($ million; log scales)
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The thin line is the 45° line. 
 
What can we conclude from the fact that M&As mostly take place between high 
income countries? As stated before an important classification in the literature is the 
difference between so-called horizontal and vertical FDI. The difference is important 
because in case of horizontal FDI firms are ‘market-seeking’ (looking for large and 
profitable markets), in case of vertical FDI firms have a ‘factor-market’ motive. In the 
former case firms are interested in the high wages of consumer, instead of low cost in 
factor markets (for example low wages) as in the latter case. Thus, both forms need 
very different models. As horizontal FDI seems to dominate the data, models that 
stress ‘market-seeking’ reasons to engage in M&As are potentially the most 
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appropriate for empirical research. Having acknowledged this, see also the previous 
section, these models have trouble explaining FDI in the face of increased economic 
integration (falling trade costs), see also Evenett (2004, p. 427). It is here that the 
models in international economics might gain (Neary, 2005) from differentiating more 
clearly between various forms of FDI, notably by including cross-border M&As as a 
separate category of FDI. 
 
 
4  Regional distribution of cross-border M&As 
In section 3 we showed that the majority of cross border M&As is between relatively 
rich countries. There is, however, in the public debate on off-shoring, which thus 
includes all forms of FDI and thus also cross border M&As as well as outsourcing, a 
strong undercurrent that looks at off shoring and thereby at FDI and its main 
component cross border M&A as “threatening”. Workers in the industrialized 
countries would lose out because of the re-location of their jobs to other, notably low-
wage countries. This fear is far from new, as illustrated by the former American 
presidential hopeful Ross Perot’s “giant sucking sound” comments (in)famously made 
in 1992 on the alleged migration of jobs from the USA to Mexico.  To assess these 
developments over time it is useful to define more or less coherent groups of 
countries, which we label “global regions.” We identify nine global regions, namely 
six developing regions and three high income regions. The six developing regions are 
based on the World Bank’s grouping in global regions (see the appendix for details): 
1. EAP: East Asia and Pacific (includes China and Indonesia) 
2. ECA: (East) Europe and Central Asia (includes Turkey and Russia) 
3. LAC: Latin America and Caribbean (includes Brazil and Mexico) 
4. MNA: Middle East and North Africa (includes Egypt) 
5. SAS: South Asia (includes India) 
6. SSA: Sub-Sahara Africa (includes Nigeria and South Africa) 
The World Bank’s group of high income countries is sub-divided into three global 
regions following van Marrewijk (2002, Ch. 1; see also Table A1 in the appendix): 
7. AAS: AustalAsia (includes Australia, Japan, and South Korea) 
8. EUR: Western Europe (includes France, UK, and Germany) 
9. NAM: North America (includes Canada and USA) 
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Figure 5 Regional distribution of M&A acquirers; value, per cent of total 
M&A acquiring regions; value (% of total)
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EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = (East) Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin America and 
Caribbean; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; SAS = South Asia; SSA = Sub-Sahara Africa; AAS 
= AustalAsia; EUR = Western Europe; NAM = North America. 
 
Figure 6 Regional distribution of M&A targets; value, per cent of total 
M&A target regions; value (% of total)
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For abbreviations: see Figure 5. 
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Figures 5 and 6 depict the evolution over time of the global regions in terms of 
acquirer and target in cross-border M&As, as a per cent of the total value of M&As in 
the respective year.  
 Western Europe (EUR) is by far the largest acquirer (on average about 55 per cent 
of the total), followed by North America (30 per cent) and AustralAsia (10 per cent). 
Over time, the share of Western Europe as an acquirer has increased and of North 
America has decreased. At the world scale, the importance of East Asia and Pacific 
(EAP) and Latin America (LAC) as an acquirer is limited (between 1 and 2 per cent) 
and of the other global regions is minimal (less than 1 per cent). Western Europe and 
North America are about equally important as the world’s largest target regions for 
M&As, on average about 44 and 38 per cent of the world total, respectively. Western 
Europe has clearly become a more important target region over time, whereas North 
America’s position has clearly declined. AustralAsia is again third (about 7 per cent), 
closely followed by Latin America (5 per cent). The importance of Eastern Europe as 
a target region has clearly increased, as has, to a lesser extent, the importance of East 
Asia and Pacific and Latin America. The importance of South Asia (SAS), the Middle 
East and North Africa (MNA), and Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) has a target region is 
minimal (less than 1 per cent).  
 
In the light of the “fear of globalization” debate that we alluded to at the beginning of 
this section, the increased importance of Eastern Europe and also of East Asia and the 
Pacific and Latin America as target region provides some evidence that cross-border 
M&As are increasingly used as a vehicle to invest from high-income countries to low-
income countries. The changes are, however, (still) modest; it remains true even in 
our regional classification above that the vast majority of FDI takes place between and 
within the three high-income regions. Table 3 provides more detail in this resepect by 
giving the regional distribution of cross-border M&As in percentages of the total for 
acquirer and target region for each of the four five-year sub-periods. It shows, for 
example, that EUR acquired 48.8 per cent of the cross-border M&As in the period 
1986-1990, of which 26.4 percentage point were destined for NAM and 19.8 
percentage points for EUR itself. Since then EUR’s share as an acquirer has been 
above 50 per cent, while its share as a target has been close to 50 per cent. Also note 
the relative importance of the intra-regional M&As.  
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Table 3 Regional distribution of cross-border M&As; 5 year averages (% of total) 
Average value 2001 – 2005  target      
acquirer AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA  
AAS 3.7 1.0 0.1 2.5 0.1 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 9.6
EAP 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4
ECA 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.7
EUR 2.1 0.5 2.9 34.6 2.0 0.4 10.2 0.3 1.1 54.2
LAC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.2
MNA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
NAM 2.3 0.7 0.5 13.3 1.4 0.1 11.2 0.2 0.1 29.8
SAS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3
SSA 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5
 8.8 2.7 4.9 51.4 5.1 0.7 24.3 0.6 1.5 100
Average value 1996 – 2000  target      
acquirer AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA  
AAS 2.6 1.6 0.1 1.1 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.1 0.0 7.5
EAP 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9
ECA 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
EUR 1.8 0.4 1.2 33.0 3.5 0.1 21.9 0.1 0.2 62.2
LAC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.9
MNA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NAM 2.2 0.3 0.2 9.8 2.3 0.0 11.0 0.2 0.2 26.1
SAS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
SSA 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.0
 7.1 2.5 1.7 44.5 7.6 0.2 35.1 0.5 0.8 100
Average value 1991 – 1995  target      
acquirer AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA  
AAS 3.0 0.7 0.2 1.3 0.2 0.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 8.5
EAP 0.5 0.2 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.0
ECA 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
EUR 2.6 0.3 1.4 34.0 1.4 0.1 15.4 0.0 0.4 55.6
LAC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.8
MNA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
NAM 2.3 0.3 0.4 12.3 2.4 0.0 12.7 0.0 0.1 30.5
SAS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
SSA 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 1.4
 8.7 1.5 2.1 49.3 5.1 0.1 32.3 0.1 0.7 100
Average value 1986 – 1990  target      
acquirer AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA  
AAS 2.5 0.4 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 9.2 0.0 0.1 16.2
EAP 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5
ECA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EUR 1.0 0.0 0.1 19.8 1.2 0.0 26.4 0.0 0.3 48.8
LAC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4
MNA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
NAM 1.3 0.0 0.0 6.6 0.4 0.0 24.9 0.0 0.4 33.7
SAS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SSA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
 4.9 0.5 0.1 30.6 1.8 0.1 61.1 0.0 0.9 100
For abbreviations: see Figure 5. 
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Most noteworthy in Table 3 is, of course, the large share of European firms buying 
other European firms, which has been close to one third of the world total since 1990. 
It seems difficult not to argue that the intra-European M&A activity has been 
stimulated by the process of EU integration, the completion of the single market. But 
if this is the case, the modern FDI models that serve as a benchmark for our chapter 
have some trouble explaining as they predict that (horizontal) FDI would become less 
important. One explanation (Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, chapter 3) might be 
that (independently from the level of trade costs) the fixed cost of taking over another 
European firm has fallen because of the streamlining of national legislation. Table 3 
also shows that the share of intra-regional M&As has been high for AustralAsia and 
North America (see also below) and that South Asia and the Middle East and North 
Africa are virtually absent as acquirer and target regions throughout the period. 
 
Table 4 Change in regional distribution of cross-border M&As; 2001-2005 five year average 
minus 1986-1990 five year average, rounded to nearest integer 
Average value 2001 – 2005  target      
acquirer AAS EAP ECA EUR LAC MNA NAM SAS SSA  
AAS 1 1  -1   -7   -7 
EAP          1 
ECA   1       2 
EUR 1 1 3 15 1  -16  1 5 
LAC     1     2 
MNA           
NAM 1 1  7 1  -14   -4 
SAS           
SSA           
 4 2 5 21 3 1 -37 1 1  
For abbreviations: see Figure 5. 
 
Table 4 highlights the changes in the distribution of cross-border M&As by 
subtracting the percentages in the period 1986-1990 from the percentages of the 
period 2001-2005 and rounding to the nearest integer. AustralAsia and North America 
have decreased most substantially as acquirer (minus 7 en minus 4 percentage points, 
respectively), while West and East Europe and Latin America have increased their 
position (plus 5, 2, and 2 percentage points, respectively). At the expense of North 
America (minus 37 percentage points) all the other regions have become more 
important targets, particularly Western and Eastern Europe, AustralAsia, and Latin 
America (plus 21, 5, 4, and 3 percentage points). The inside of the table shows that 
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the most important distributional change has been European firms buying European 
instead of American firms, and similarly for American firms.  
 
Figure 7 Inter-regional cross-border M&As; % of total (value), 2001-2005 
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NB: all intra-regional M&As are excluded from the figure. The total value of inter-regional M&As is 
100 per cent; only flows above 0.5 per cent are shown (this excludes 53 of 72 possible arrows).  
 
Finally, we focus attention on inter-regional M&As, which gives us an indication of 
the extent to which different global regions interact with one another. These flows can 
obviously be (roughly) deduced from Table 3 or the various sub-periods by 
disregarding the diagonal entries (which sum to about 50 per cent of the total) and re-
adjusting the remaining entries to sum to 100 per cent inter-regional M&As. Figure 7 
graphically depicts the inter-regional cross-border connections for the most recent 
five-year period (2001-2005), rounded to the nearest integer. Since there are 9 global 
regions there are 72 different inter-regional connections. Only 19 of these are actually 
shown in Figure 7 because the remaining 53 are rounded to 0 per cent. First, we note 
that by far the largest inter-regional M&As are from North America to Western 
Europe (28 per cent of the total), and vice versa (22 per cent of the total). Together 
these two flows account for 50 per cent of all inter-regional M&As and clearly dwarf 
the importance of all other inter-regional connections. Second, we note that Western 
Europe is substantially buying up firms in Eastern Europe (6 per cent). Third, we note 
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that the other connections between the high income regions (between EUR and AAS 
and between NAM and AAS) are substantial (about 5 per cent each). Fourth, we note 
that M&As toward East Asia and the Pacific are still rather small, certainly compared 
to the attention this receives in the popular media. Fifth, and finally, we note that 
Western Europe is the only global region with connections to all other regions. This is 
reminiscent of the dominance of Western Europe in inter-regional trade flows, see van 
Marrewijk (2007, Ch. 1). So, it seems safe to conclude this section with the 
observation that indeed most FDI and M&As take place between the relatively 
wealthy parts of the world. This observation is in line with our previous findings as to 
cross border M&As being mainly of the horizontal type. 
 
5  Countries and M&As over time  
In view of the high coincidence between acquiring and target countries discussed in 
sections 3 and 4, it is interesting to make a difference between the largest gross 
acquirers and targets and the largest net acquirers and targets of M&As. Looking at 
net figures corrects for (country) size differences and reveals possible changes in the 
direction of FDI flows. Since the value and number of cross-border M&As varies 
substantially even for the world as a whole, see Figure 3, it should come as no 
surprise that this variation is even more substantial at the country level, certainly 
when we look at net M&A flows. This is illustrated in Figure 8 for the two largest net 
acquiring countries (UK and France) and net target countries (USA and Brazil) for the 
period 1985-2005. For the UK, for example, the fluctuations around the average of 
$19.1 bn per year range from a low of  -$78 bn in 2004 to a high of $295 bn in 1999. 
For the USA, similarly, the fluctuations around the average of -$31.3 bn per year 
range from a low of -$205 bn in 2000 to a high of $46 bn in 2003.  
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Figure 8 Cross-border M&As; four largest net acquirers and net targets 
Cross-border M&As; four largest net acquirors and net targets; 
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To mitigate the impact of fluctuations over time and to identify important trends over 
longer time periods, Table 5 lists the most important countries for each of the four 
categories identified above for the period 1986-2005 as a whole, sub-divided into four 
five-year sub-periods.  
 Table 5a lists the top 10 acquiring countries, consisting of the USA, Canada, 
Australia, Japan, and six European countries (UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and Spain). The US and the UK are about equally important in this 
respect, although the US tops the list in three of the four sub-periods. The role of the 
Netherlands and Spain as an acquiring nation has become more important in the last 
10 years and that of Australia in the last 5 years. In contrast, the role of Japan as an 
acquiring nation has clearly reduced over time.  
 Table 5b lists the top 10 target countries. Except for Italy and Sweden (which 
replace Switzerland and Japan) it consists of the same countries as Table 5a. The US 
is undisputedly the largest target country, followed by the UK and Germany. The role 
of the UK as a target country has clearly increased over time. Similarly, to a lesser 
extent, has the role of other European countries, particularly in the last five years. 
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Table 5 Largest M&A countries; acquiring and targets, gross and net flows 
a. Ten largest acquiring M&A countries, 1986-2005 (constant 2005 $ billion) 
  annual average acquiring flows 
 country 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1986-2005
1 United States 41.1 42.3 142.3 118.0 85.9 
2 United Kingdom 37.2 27.0 200.3 76.7 85.3 
3 France 17.0 13.2 85.6 34.9 37.7 
4 Germany 6.4 10.7 68.7 31.5 29.3 
5 Netherlands 4.3 8.1 39.8 32.8 21.2 
6 Canada 13.3 7.5 29.9 24.1 18.7 
7 Switzerland 6.1 8.0 28.8 15.8 14.7 
8 Spain 2.0 2.9 27.1 24.5 14.1 
9 Australia 8.2 3.7 14.1 21.4 11.9 
10 Japan 16.0 3.7 13.7 8.9 10.6 
b. Ten largest target M&A countries, 1986-2005 (constant 2005 $ billion) 
  annual average target flows 
 country 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1986-2005
1 United States 86.5 44.6 238.4 99.6 117.3 
2 United Kingdom 29.6 22.7 119.7 92.7 66.2 
3 Germany 4.1 7.9 83.3 40.3 33.9 
4 Canada 11.3 6.9 37.6 22.2 19.5 
5 France 5.8 12.9 28.9 26.1 18.4 
6 Netherlands 3.0 5.7 29.4 20.6 14.7 
7 Australia 4.1 8.4 18.0 13.5 11.0 
8 Italy 3.8 5.8 10.4 21.8 10.5 
9 Sweden 1.7 4.9 23.7 10.3 10.2 
10 Spain 3.1 5.0 11.1 11.8 7.8 
c. Five largest net acquiring M&A countries, 1986-2005 (constant 2005 $ billion) 
  annual average net acquiring flows (acquiring – target) 
 country 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1986-2005
1 France 11.3 0.3 56.8 8.8 19.3 
2 United Kingdom 7.6 4.3 80.6 -16.0 19.1 
3 Switzerland 3.5 5.5 20.3 8.0 9.3 
4 Netherlands 1.3 2.4 10.3 12.3 6.6 
5 Spain -1.1 -2.1 16.0 12.7 6.4 
d. Five largest net target M&A countries, 1986-2005 (constant 2005 $ billion) 
  annual average net target flows (target – acquiring) 
 country 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1986-2005
1 United States 45.4 2.3 96.1 -18.4 31.3 
2 Brazil 0.2 0.6 18.6 2.8 5.6 
3 Germany -2.4 -2.7 14.5 8.8 4.6 
4 China 0.0 0.2 11.4 5.3 4.2 
5 Argentina 1.8 1.3 11.0 1.8 4.0 
 
 Table 5c lists the top 5 net acquiring countries, consisting of five European 
countries: France, UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Spain. Of these five, 
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Switzerland and the Netherlands have been stable net acquiring countries throughout 
the time period, whereas the net position of France has been more volatile. The UK’s 
net position recently switched from acquiring to target, and vice versa for Spain. 
 Finally and most interestingly from the globalization debate perspective, Table 5d 
lists the top 5 net target countries, consisting of the US, Brazil, Germany, China, and 
Argentina. Of these five, Brazil and Argentina have been stable net target countries 
throughout the period, whereas China, like Germany, became an important net target 
in the last 10 years only. The US has been a primary net target most of the time, 
switching roles with the UK only in the last five years. The analysis reveals that 
despite the dominant position of the US, recently high income countries are turning 
towards emerging markets, of which China stands out as the most recent net target. 
Folk wisdom about the increasing importance of China – and other promising markets 
– thus seems correct in this respect. This also implies a challenge for FDI modeling. 
Typically, see Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, chapter 3), when the possibility of 
M&A as an FDI option is taken into account this is in models of horizontal FDI, 
which given the facts we have presented so far, should not come as a surprise. But, the 
information provided by Table 5d suggests that (increasingly?) cross border M&A is 
also aimed at low(er) income countries where the market seeking aspect is probably 
far less relevant than the (labor) cost saving argument. This means that cross border 
M&A should be part of models of vertical FDI as well. It might be that cross border 
M&As become an increasingly viable alternative for Greenfield FDI or outright 
outsourcing in view of the well-known asymmetric information problems (the hold up 
problem) associated with the FDI-versus-outsourcing decision. 
 
6 Inequality between cross-border M&As 
One of the reasons for the attention for the M&A phenomenon in- and certainly 
outside academia is undoubtedly the sense of involvement of national pride in M&A 
deals (either positively or negatively). Another, perhaps even more important, reason 
for this attention is the size of some of the cross-border M&A. Indeed, some of the 
deals are so large that they can have a substantial influence on a country’s position as 
a (net) acquirer or target. Table 6 lists the largest deals by year of announcement, 
valued in current and constant dollars, as well as the two countries that are involved. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this table. First, there is substantial variation 
in the maximum value over time (a 50-fold difference between the highest and lowest 
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value). Second, a single deal can indeed have a substantial influence. The Vodafone 
takeover of Mannesmann already mentioned in section 2 is by far the largest M&A. It 
has also clearly influenced the net acquiring position of the UK and the net target 
position of Germany. Third, the USA is by far the most popular target country for 
these mega deals (12 out of 20 observations), while Europe is the most popular 
acquiring region (13 out of 20 observations). Fourth, and finally, even when measured 
in constant dollars, there seems to be a tendency for the maximum value to increase 
over time.2 This has led to the suggestion in the literature that the size distribution of 
M&As has become more unequal over time (Evenett, 2004). This section analyzes 
that suggestion in more detail.  
 
Table 6 Value of largest cross-border M&As (announced year) 
 value of deal (bn.) Firm and country information 
  constant acquiring target 
 year current $ 2005 $ firm country firm country 
1986 3.6 5.6 Campeau Canada Allied Stores USA 
1987 7.9 12.0 BP America USA Standard Oil USA 
1988 6.5 9.7 Campeau Canada Fed Dep St. USA 
1989 7.9 11.4 Beecham UK Smith Kline USA 
1990 7.4 10.3 Matsuhita E Japan MCA USA 
1991 3.3 4.3 Altus Fin. France Ex. Life USA 
1992 4.6 6.0 Reed UK Elsevier Netherl. 
1993 6.3 8.0 Metro etc. Malaysia ASKO etc. Germany 
1994 5.3 6.5 Roche Switzerl. Syntex USA 
1995 7.3 8.8 Hoechst Germany Marion etc. USA 
1996 4.2 5.0 Fresenius Germany Nat Med ca USA 
1997 17.1 19.8 Zürich Vers Switzerl. BAT Ind UK 
1998 48.2 54.9 BP UK Amoco USA 
1999 202.8 228.7 Vodafone UK Mannesman Germany 
2000 46.0 51.1 France Tel France Orange UK 
2001 12.8 14.0 Citigroup USA Banacci Mexico 
2002 15.3 16.2 HSBC UK Household I USA 
2003 11.1 11.6 Manulife Canada J Hancock USA 
2004 74.6 76.5 R D Petrol Netherl. Shell Transp UK 
2005 31.7 31.7 Telefonica Spain O2  UK 
 
                                                 
2 A trendline of the logarithm of the maximum value in the period 1985-2005 explains about half of the 
variance and suggests a rate of increase at 0.13 per cent per year. 
Cross-border M&As: the facts 
© Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk, 2006  23 
Figure 9 Lorenz curves of cross-border M&As, selected years 
Lorenz curve; cross-border M&As, 2005
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A proper understanding of the degree of inequality of a distribution must, of course, 
take all observations into consideration, rather than focusing just on the maximum 
value. An excellent, and popular, method is to construct Lorenz curves, where the 
observations are ordered in increasing value, with the share of the cumulative number 
of deals on the horizontal axis and the share of the cumulative value of these deals on 
the vertical axis. Figure 9 provides examples of these curves in the years 1991, 1999, 
and 2005. If all the observations in a particular year had an equal value, the Lorenz 
curve would coincide with the diagonal. The area below the diagonal and above the 
curve (times two) therefore provides a measure of the inequality of the observations, a 
number between 0 (complete equality) and 1 (complete inequality) known as the Gini 
coefficient. We calculated the Gini coefficient for each year of our data set. 
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Figure 10 Cross-border M&As, 1985-2005; Gini coefficients and value 
Cross-border M&As, 1986 - 2005; Gini coefficients (left hand scale) 
and value in 2005 $ billion (right hand scale)
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Figure 10 provides an overview of the evolution of the Gini coefficient over time for 
the period 1986-2005. There is, indeed, a tendency of the Gini coefficient to increase 
over time, supporting the suggestion that the degree of inequality in cross-border 
M&As increases over time.3 The variation from year to year is substantial, however, 
ranging from a low of 0.649 in 1991 to a high of 0.853 in 1999, see also the associated 
Lorenz curves in Figure 9. More importantly, by including the evolution over time of 
the total value of cross-border M&As in the same diagram, Figure 10 draws attention 
to the relationship between inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient and the 
wave phenomenon. Clearly, the Gini coefficient increases during the 4th wave of the 
late 1980s, then declines after this peak has been reached, to increase again during the 
5th wave of the late 1990s, to decline again after the absolute peak in 1999, and starts 
to increase again during the 6th wave starting in 2003.  
 
                                                 
3 A trendline of the Gini coefficient explains almost half of the variance and suggests an increase in the 
Gini value at a rate of about 0.0061 per year. 
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Figure 11 Relative changes in value of M&As and Gini coefficient, 1986-2005 
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Figure 11 illustrates the coincidence of changes in inequality, measured by the relative 
change in the Gini coefficient, and merger waves, measured by the relative change in 
the value of cross-border M&As. There is a clear positive relationship between these 
two phenomena. If we let tGI  be the Gini coefficient in year t, tV  the value of cross-
border M&As (in constant 2005 $ bn), and let ~ denote a relative change, that is 
11 /)(~ −−−≡ tttt xxxx   for ttt VGIx ,= , then we get (t-values in parentheses): 
(2) 75.0;~1085.01207.1~ 2
)38.7()76.1(
=⋅+−≈
−
RVIG tt  
A one per cent increase in the value of cross-border M&As therefore causes about a 
0.1 per cent increase in the Gini coefficient. The gradual increase in the real value of 
cross-border M&As over time is therefore probably largely responsible for the 
observed increase in inequality.4 This begs the question what causes the increase in 
the value of the M&As during the 1990s. The most important reason is that 
regulations with respect to M&A have changed over time. Especially the financial 
service sector, banking sector, (tele)communication sector, and media firms have been 
allowed to merge with or acquire ‘over-seas’ firms (Evenett, 2004, Muelfeld et al., 
2007). Once the regulations became more relaxed, the local ‘giants’ were looking for 
profitable M&A. Does this make sense from the perspective of the modern FDI 
                                                 
4 It should be noted, moreover, that changes in the maximum M&A value are only weakly (positively) 
correlated with changes in the Gini coefficient. 
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theories that play such a dominant role in the current research in international 
economics?  To start with, the idea of merger waves can be explained as equation (1) 
already suggests that once the initial mergers have taken place and competition is 
reduced it becomes profitable for other firms to also become engaged in the M&A 
activity, but the problem is how to explain the initial mergers. The association of the 
merger wave, with a strong European flavor, with changes in regulation can be 
aligned with theoretical models of (horizontal) FDI as long as this is looked upon as a 
decrease in the organizational costs of setting up and arranging a M&A. If these costs 
are to be looked upon as a fall in trade costs and thus as a manifestation of increased 
economic integration these models are thus, as we have argued before, not very well 
equipped to explain the data in Figure 10. May be, the limits of existing FDI models 
with more or less all build on equation (1) come to the fore here and to understand 
what is driving merger waves we might look at alternative theories like the managerial 
hubris theory (Roll, 1986). Managers tend to err positively when it comes to the 
valuation of targets, and thus tend to overpay. Especially during the hay day of the 
dotcom bubble in the late 1990s this could explain the increase in value of the M&As. 
Although managerial hubris is not part of our categorization scheme from box 1, it 
points to the fact that  M&A are facilitated in the upswings of business cycles. 
 
7 Looking more closely at individual firms that engage in M&A  
Until now we have not discussed individual firms.5 In this section we briefly discuss 
the main insight that results from the research on FDI and firm heterogeneity namely 
that within a sector there is considerable firm heterogeneity to the effect that only the 
most productive firms are expected to be engaged in FDI and thus in cross-border 
M&A (as an acquiring firm).  The idea that firms from the same sector differ (a lot) is 
probably not a path breaking observation, but for the fact that there is a systematic 
relation between plant productivity and the mode of entry in international trade. 
Bernard et al. (2003) show that a systematic relation exists between productivity and 
whether or not firms are engaged in exports. They show that of 200.000 (US-) firms in 
their sample only 21 percent report any export. Less than 5 per cent of these firms 
export more than 50 per cent, which shows that even if firms are engaged in 
                                                 
5 The Thomson data do not allow us to calculate the productivity measures as used by Bernard et al. 
(2003) or differentiate between domestic sales exports or FDI at the plant level. In this section we 
review some of the relevant literature that has original plant level data on productivity. 
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international trade, most are still most active in domestic  markets – two-thirds of the 
exporters export less than 10 per cent of their output. Most interestingly, those that 
export have higher productivity levels, and thus are able to charge a higher mark-up. 
Given the fact that international trade is more costly than domestic sales, only 
productive firms are able to cover trade costs. Despite these trade costs they can still 
be competitive in foreign markets, just because they are efficient. So, export reveals 
high productive plants.  
 
Helpman et al. (2004) take this line of reasoning one step further by not only looking 
at the export decision, but by also taking the FDI decision into account. Because FDI 
is even more expensive than exports, only the most efficient firms are able to engage 
in FDI. They find strong evidence for a sample of US and European firms that only 
the most productive firms are engaged in FDI. Studies like these confirm the notion 
that transportation costs are not only important to describe international trade patterns, 
but also FDI flows. We report these results because they also explain why most FDI is 
between rich countries (see sections 3 and 4). Instead of emphasizing market-seeking 
arguments, the firm heterogeneity argument points out that most FDI and thus cross 
border M&A is between rich countries because that is where the most productive 
firms are located. Our data set, the Thomson data set on M&A, does not allow for an 
easy differentiation of firms in terms of productivity, but additional stylized facts on 
the productivity of firms engaged in cross border M&A could help to establish if this 
new firm heterogeneity literature makes sense when applied to M&A. We leave this 
for future research.    
 
8 Summary and Conclusions 
The well-known advice of Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) to “estimate, don’t test”, 
implies that, given the current state of the theories and the quality of the data, the 
Popperian test of falsifying a theory is hardly possible (ibid, p. 1314): “we may 
statistically “reject” the theory, but leave it completely unharmed nonetheless. After all, we 
already knew it wasn’t literally true.” What empirical work should be doing, according to 
them, is (ibid, p. 1342): “not to test the validity of the theory but to determine if the theory is 
working adequately in its limited domain.” So, in practice the distinction between 
verifying or falsifying theories is less clear-cut than one would ideally want. This 
boils down to ask theorists to think about the link between theory and observable 
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phenomena. The aim of this chapter is to present the correlations in the data on cross 
border M&As, and ask the theorists to develop useful models that give us some 
understanding about the underlying causation. Our chapter provides guidelines for 
theory on an very important phenomenon, cross-border M&As, as to what the most 
important correlations might be. Using the well-known Thomson data set, we show 
that cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have a number of features:  
• most FDI is in the form of cross-border M&As, 
• firms engaged in cross-border M&As seem to be ‘market-seeking’, 
• cross-border M&As come in waves (the most recent wave is still unfolding),  
• economic integration (international deregulation) stimulated M&As, 
• the size of and inequality between M&As grows (over time).  
Our contention in this chapter is that these stylized facts drive and should drive 
theoretical contributions from international economics that try to understand cross-
border M&As. A number of recent models that are firmly rooted in the 1st principles 
of trade theory, see Neary (2003), go a long way in explaining some of these facts. 
What is still missing, given our stylized facts, is a full-fledged model of M&As. It 
might of course be that tools of modern international economics do not allow for such 
an all encompassing theory but ongoing research by economists like Neary, Helpman 
or Mélitz suggests that our understanding of cross-border M&As will improve in the 
near future. This is real progress, because from the perspective of mainstream 
international economics, cross-border M&As has too long been a case of interesting 
facts in search of a theory.   
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Appendix Global regions 
 
Table A1 Global regions: country composition 
EAP – East Asia and Pacific; 27 developing countries 
American Samoa Marshall Islands Samoa 
Cambodia Micronesia Solomon Islands 
China Mongolia Taiwan 
Fiji Myanmar Thailand 
Indonesia Nauru Timor, East 
Kiribati N. Mariana Islands Tonga 
Korea, North Palau Tuvalu 
Laos Papua New Guinea Vanuatu 
Malaysia Philippines Vietnam 
ECA – Europe and Central Asia; 28 developing countries 
Albania Hungary Russia 
Armenia Kazakhstan Serbia and Montenegro 
Azerbaijan Kyrgyz Republic Slovak Republic 
Belarus Latvia Tajikistan 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Lithuania Turkey 
Bulgaria Macedonia Turkmenistan 
Croatia Moldova Ukraine 
Czech Republic Poland Uzbekistan 
Estonia Romania Yugoslavia 
Georgia    
LAC – Latin America and the Caribbean; 33 developing countries 
Argentina Ecuador Nicaragua 
Barbados El Salvador Panama 
Belize French Guiana Paraguay 
Bolivia Grenada Peru 
Brazil Guatemala St Kitts and Nevis 
Chile Guyana St Lucia 
Colombia Haiti St Vincent & Grenadines 
Costa Rica Honduras Suriname 
Cuba Jamaica Trinidad And Tobago 
Dominica Martinique Uruguay 
Dominican Republic Mexico Venezuela 
MNA – Middle East and North Africa; 14 developing countries 
Algeria Jordan Syria 
Djibouti Lebanon Tunisia 
Egypt Libya West Bank 
Iran Morocco Yemen 
Iraq Oman   
SAS – South Asia; 8 developing countries 
Afghanistan India Pakistan 
Bangladesh Maldives Sri Lanka 
Bhutan Nepal   
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Table A1  continued 
SSA - Sub Sahara Africa; 48 developing countries 
Angola Gabon Niger 
Benin Gambia Nigeria 
Botswana Ghana Rwanda 
Burkina Faso Guinea Sao Tome And Principe 
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Senegal 
Cameroon Kenya Seychelles 
Cape Verde Lesotho Sierra Leone 
Central African Republic Liberia Somalia 
Chad Madagascar South Africa 
Comoros Malawi Sudan 
Congo Mali Swaziland 
Congo, Dem Rep (Zaire) Mauritania Tanzania 
Cote D'ivoire Mauritius Togo 
Equatorial Guinea Mayotte Uganda 
Eritrea Mozambique Zambia 
Ethiopia Namibia Zimbabwe 
AAS - Australasia; 8 high income countries 
Australia Japan New Zealand 
Brunei Korea, South Singapore 
Hong Kong Macao   
EUR - Western Europe; 36 high income countries 
Andorra Greenland New Caledonia 
Austria Iceland Norway 
Bahrain Ireland Portugal 
Belgium Isle Of Man Qatar 
Channel Islands Israel San Marino 
Cyprus Italy Saudi Arabia 
Denmark Kuwait Slovenia 
Faeroe Islands Liechtenstein Spain 
Finland Luxembourg Sweden 
France Malta Switzerland 
Germany Monaco United Arab Emirates 
Greece Netherlands United Kingdom 
NAM - North America; 11 high income countries 
Antigua and Barbuda Canada Puerto Rico 
Aruba Cayman Islands United States 
Bahamas Guam Virgin Islands (Us) 
Bermuda Neth. Antilles   
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